Please check out our Call For Papers.
Want to Present Your Work at an SPP Workshop?
Please check out our Call For Papers.
Please check out our Call For Papers.
Please join us for the fourth workshop of the Spring 2016 Term:
Jonathan Kwan, The Graduate Center, CUNY
Thursday, May 12th, 2016, 12:30-2:00pm
Location: Room 5409
Please see the abstract for the talk below.
Located at both the core and interstices of a wide array of political issues ranging from democratic legitimacy, global justice, self-determination, and secession, the concept of the people is a thorny and mercurial one—serving to play numerous normative roles and purposes. If democracy is rule by the people, who are the people? In this paper, I argue that the social ontology of the people should be understood as a group of persons that inhabits a bounded territory and engages in common activity to realize shared purposes, where such activity is continuously constituted by processes of collective decision-making that are or aspire to be in the form of binding laws and institutions. Any account of the people as bounded and thus exclusionary faces the membership question of who should be included as part of the people. Appealing to democratic decision-making procedures to answer this question generates an infinite regress since there will need to be a prior people to decide who is to be a member of the people, and so on and so forth. I consider and reject three responses to this regress problem, which include the view that the people is simply determined by contingent historical forces, the “all-affected interests” principle for determining the people’s scope, and the position that the demos is unbounded. The membership question and the infinite regress problem raises the issue of the legitimacy of the people. Namely, can the continued existence of a people over time as excluding some be legitimized? And if so, what would be required to attain and sustain this legitimacy? The approach I adopt to address this issue of the legitimacy of the people is twofold. First, I will argue that a people’s territorial boundedness is important for the exercise of meaningful self- determination over the particular location it inhabits. Many common activities of a people will be attached to a particular location itself and be given meaning by being pursued there and not elsewhere. A people’s territorial boundedness enables its members to decide for themselves how these place-related joint activities should be structured and shaped free from the interference of others. The necessity of a people’s boundedness, however, does not eliminate the need for its legitimization. Rather, since the very purpose behind a people’s boundedness is to secure self-determination, it must also respect the self-determination of those it constitutes as outsiders if it is to legitimize their exclusion. This will require at least that the people recognize the self- determination of other peoples, generally by respecting their sovereignty, and the right of people- less persons to be members of a people (Hannah Arendt’s ‘right to have rights’). The overall picture then is that the exclusion of some from a people is necessary to secure the meaningful self-determination of its members and that such exclusion is legitimate insofar as the people respects the self-determination of others that it constitutes as outsiders.
Please join us for the third workshop of the Spring 2016 Term:
Jesse Spafford, The Graduate Center, CUNY
Thursday, April 14th, 2016, 12:30-2:00pm
Location: GC Philosophy Dept. Thesis Room
Please see the abstract for the talk below.
In Why Not Socialism? (2009), G. A. Cohen proposes a set of egalitarian principles presented as a statement of the socialist philosophical position. Of these, Cohen’s principle of community has drawn recent attention with its claim that any significant material inequality (or, more generally inequality in life outcomes) undermines community between people and, thus, ought to be condemned.
Why does inequality undermine community in this way? According to one common reading—put forward by James Otteson (2014) and Jason Brennan (2015) among many others—Cohen’s claim is that inequality strips away the common ground that wealthy and poor individuals once shared such that they are left with no basis for relating meaningfully to one another. By contrast, this paper proposes an alternative reading of Cohen’s principle whereby inequality is taken to undermine community because it introduces an underlying source of antagonism between individuals that is reflected in the various taboos that constrict the domain of socially-acceptable discourse.
The paper argues that the alternative interpretation ought to be preferred because it makes better sense of the thought experiment Cohen uses to support his principle; better coheres with Cohen’s other writings (most notably essays appearing in Rescuing Justice and Equality (2008)); and gives the principle greater normative weight.
A further advantage of the interpretation is that it avoids a serious objection raised by Brennan against the standard reading of the principle of community. Specifically, Brennan argues that the principle of community—at least, as it has traditionally been interpreted—is both unsupported by the arguments Cohen provides and entails the unacceptable conclusion that any sort of lifestyle diversity undermines community. The paper will concede the argument, but contends that the alternative interpretation avoids this objection and, thus, ought to be preferred to the standard reading on the grounds of charitable interpretation.
Please join us for the second workshop of the Spring 2016 Term:
Alex R. Steers McCrum, The Graduate Center, CUNY
Thursday, March 10th, 2016, 12:30-2:00pm
Location: Room 5414
Please see the abstract for the talk below.
Both popularly and philosophically, race in the U.S. is most often talked about in terms of black and white, sometimes as though these are the only two races in the country, and other times in terms of a kind of spectrum running from whiteness to blackness. This binary is usually implicit, borne out by the focus of examples. Such a conception does not map onto actual racial structures in the U.S. I will criticize this binary, focusing on Indigenous Peoples, who have never fit into it, either in theory nor in practice. Victims of historical exclusion, land theft, cultural liquidation, murder, and outright genocide, the Native American peoples were never integrated into a racially-ordered U.S. society en masse and thus problematize traditional models of race. In order to account for the experiences of Native Americans, I believe it is necessary to construct a new theory of the meaning of race. In assembling this theory, I will attempt to bridge philosophical critical race studies and Native American studies, surveying leading conceptions of race to see whether and to what extent they are applicable to Native Americans, and examine them for aspects that should be adopted or modified, and aspects that are best discarded. I will argue for a conception of race that is nonessential, socially constructed, and spatio-temporally located, subject to change over time and reinterpretation across localities. Having established a conception of race that can include Native Americans, I will discuss the implications of a Native American race in greater detail, including how it might be politically useful, while also keeping in mind the practical and theoretical dangers of essentializing a Native race concept. Finally, I will take up an important question that will be suggested by my theory of race: whether or not all Indigenous Peoples around the globe are, in fact, a single race. I will not purport to prove this thesis but, more modestly, suggest that it is descriptively plausible and potentially efficacious. My intent is that the theory I provide will be both conceptually and socially useful, that it will be able to make sense of common race talk while also providing normative support to anti-domination projects, broadly construed, particularly the processes of solidarity and coalition-building between and among oppressed racial groups.
Please join us for the first workshop of the Spring 2016 Term:
Aaron Bentley, The Graduate Center, CUNY
Thursday, February 18th, 2016, 12:30-2:00pm
Location: GC Philosophy Dept. Thesis Room
Please see the abstract for the talk below.
In this paper I will propose an alternative approach to certain kinds of questions in social ontology and social metaphysics. This represents a reaction to a trend in contemporary social ontology which uses social ontological theories to defend certain positions in normative political philosophy. I will argue that many social ontological claims are themselves essentially normative claims and that the relationship between social ontology and normative political and social theory cannot be one of grounding the political in the metaphysical. To do so, I will describe and defend what I will call the ethical approach to social ontology and apply it to a contemporary debate over the structure of collective intentions. I will defend the coherence of adopting the ethical stance by defending two claims: (1) that the social world and the means we have of producing it are not fixed and are produced through human activity; (2) that social objects and our means of producing them are subject to ethical evaluation. Following this, I will apply this approach to the debate over collective intentions and discuss the implications of the approach for future work in social ontology.
Please join us for the third workshop of the Spring 2015 Term:
Kenneth Courtney, The Graduate Center, CUNY
Monday, April 20th, 2015
Time: 4:00pm
Location: Room 5109
Please see the abstract for the talk below.
Disputes have continued since Pitkin’s seminal work on representation regarding the representative’s obligations to enact the popular mandate and, when appropriate, to act as an independent maker of decisions. While much has since been written regarding the forms through which popular mandates might be best realized, and—though considerably less—about those occasions on which a representative is empowered to act independently of such mandates, surprisingly little has been said about the normative grounding of these obligations. More recent work in political science has even proffered an account of political representation purged of normativity altogether—hence without invoking obligations—suggesting that if a relevant audience in the right circumstances recognizes an individual to be a representative, he or she should be understood as a representative. Such an approach undervalues normative dimensions that I will argue are central to our best understanding of political representation. Although an account that identifies representation with democratic legitimacy would indeed be too narrow, an account that says nothing about obligations held by representatives both with regard to those they represent and with regard to the frameworks within which representation occurs remains inadequate. Considerations invoked in a non-normative “general account” regarding what constitutes representation—determining the relevant audience, specifying appropriate circumstances, and providing criteria for the selection of representatives— end up requiring judgments that are best seen as irreducibly normative after all. Such an account further threatens to completely sever the activity of a representative from the interests of a constituency. We can better begin to discern normative features of political representation by considering the role of representative and the practice of representation more carefully.
Please join us for the third workshop of the Spring 2015 Term:
Josh Keton, The Graduate Center, CUNY
Tuesday, March 24th, 2015, 4:30-6:00pm
Location: Room 5109 (Globalization Room)
Please see the abstract for the talk below.
On the Limited Significance of Coercion in Theorizing the Nature of the State
A central concern of political, legal and social theorists in the modern period has been to explore and ground morality and justice in terms of freedom and autonomy. One obvious threat to a person’s exercise of their freedom and autonomy is coercion—being forced by others to act contrary to one’s own will. As a result, the concept of coercion has been a central focus of many political, legal, and social theorists. . I argue that once we have analyzed coercion properly we will see that coercion is both dramatically more widespread than we had first assumed. This has the effect of making it the case that the “political” as it has been demarcated by some is much less contained than those theorists suspect, with radical implications for the need to extend principles of justice to areas of life which have normally been thought to be exempt.
Please join us for the third workshop of the Spring 2015 Term:
Jennifer M. Morton, Department of Philosophy, City College of New York
Tuesday, February 24th, 2015, 4:30-6:00pm
Location: Room 7113 (GC Philosophy Department Thesis Room)
Please see the abstract for the talk below.
Recently, the distinction between ideal and non-ideal theory has been a topic of central interest to political philosophers and philosophers of education. The divide is often thought to map a difference in theoretical methodology in so far as ideal theorists derive their theories under a different set of assumptions than non-ideal theorists. Political theorists who favor ideal theories defend the value of developing theories of justice that assume full compliance, complete and universal virtue, or unfeasible political conditions. Political theorists who favor non-ideal theory argue that ideal theory is hopeless, irrelevant, or unnecessary to the achievement and development of feasible political goals. These two methodological commitments are not on the face of it incompatible or in tension with each other. Consequently, the ecumenical position suggests that ideal theory can be harmoniously pursued alongside non-ideal theory. They are simply two different theoretical tasks. But this way of understanding what divides ideal from non-ideal theorizing misrepresents the central issue as a mere academic concern for theorists. In so doing, it ignores the much deeper way in which these two ways of thinking about justice pervade our experiences as agents in the moral and political sphere and can lead to practical tensions.
In this paper, I discuss educators as a prime exemplar of agents who not only experience the tension between ideal and non-ideal ways of thinking, but for whom understanding and coming to terms with this tension is of great practical import. I argue that it is central to the educator’s role as educator and as citizen to engage in ideal and non-ideal thinking. This is because the educator is essentially engaged in two tasks. The first task is educating future citizens. In so far, as the educator is involved in this task he is playing a role in making certain future social facts true. These facts are some of the ones on which the justice of our future society supervene. The second task an educator is engaged in is preparing students with the skills and knowledge they need to navigate the world as they will find it. In pursuing this task, the educator is assuming certain social facts, some of them unjust. These two goals lead to difficult tensions in how educators carry out their work. I argue that this tension can be best resolved if we understand the ideal theorizing engaged in by educators as an expression of respect towards his fellow citizens. I argue that this expressive component is crucial to the educator’s role as educator and as citizen.
In section I, I elucidate the ideal/non-ideal distinction. In section II, I describe three examples of educators that show ideal and non-ideal thinking at work. In section III, I argue that it is essential to the role of an educator to engage in both ideal and non-ideal thinking. In the fourth section, I offer a defense of the importance of the expressive value of ideal thinking. In the final section, I argue that political theorists can learn something important about the ideal/non-ideal divide by reflecting on the case of educators.
Spring 2015 Call For Abstracts If you would like to offer a paper-in-progress for discussion at a Spring 2015 SPP workshop, please submit an abstract (no more than 500 words) to cunysppworkshop@gmail.com by January 31, 2015. If we have more submissions than available workshop spaces, we will prioritize submissions based on diversity of approach and overlap with recent workshops. Submissions for Spring 2015 will automatically be considered for workshops in future semesters.
Please join us for our last workshop of the Fall 2014 Term, which will consist of two shorter presentations:
Aaron Bentley, The Graduate Center, CUNY
Tuesday, December 2nd, 2014, 4:15-5:15pm
Location: Room 5109
Matthew Rachar, The Graduate Center, CUNY
Tuesday, December 2nd, 2014, 5:15-6:15pm
Location: Room 5109
Please see the abstracts for the workshop below.
The aim of this paper will be to give an interpretation of Marx’s conception and use of dialectic in his larger philosophical project as well as to provide a precise account of the central concepts of the dialectical method as they are used by Marx. Understanding how Marx understands and uses dialectic is important in at least two ways. First, clarifying a central methodological tool employed by Marx can help clarify his project more generally. Second, something like Marx’s account of the uses of dialectal reasoning has potential as contemporary critique or revision of certain theories of social and political action and rationality. The second of these is my central I will argue that Marx is best interpreted as employing two distinct, but compatible notions of dialectic. First, he uses it in a manner that is straightforwardly compatible with his materialism, as a descriptive logic of history. Second, and more controversially, I will argue that Marx works with and uses a dialectic of ideas and that this use of dialectic is of great importance to the coherence of his greater philosophical project. The view emerges when one pays examines the way that partially free human activity is taken by Marx as that which drives, social, political, and historical change the study of which are at the heart of Marx’s program. In conjunction with Marx’s view of the aims of philosophy as revolutionary this view of human activity will be shown to require a dialectic of ideas. I will claim that this latter notion of dialectic is of great The paper proceeds in three steps. First I will argue for that Marx does endorse both forms of dialectic mentioned above, focusing on how this view can be consistently maintained in conjunction with Marx’s widely noted commitment to materialism. I will then go on to argue for a particular interpretation of the key concepts of dialectic as used by Marx: ‘contradiction’, ‘presupposition’, and ‘negation’. These interpretations will fall out of a proposed account of the relationship between ideal and descriptive forms of dialectic in Marx and the interpretation of key passages of Marx’s Grundrisse in which he employs these key dialectical concepts. In this section, I will also try to make these concepts logically precise in order to make clear the relationship between of dialectical methodology and so-called ‘analytical’ methodology, characterized primarily in terms of a commitment to classical logic. The upshot of this interpretation of Marx’s dialectic will be spelled out in the final section. I will argue that Marx account of dialectic can and should be taken as a contribution to the theory of action and practical rationality. I will do this by quickly offering an interpretation of Michael Bratman’s influential, contemporary account of practical reasoning as planning in practical contexts, and using it to show how how the interpretation of dialectic given in this paper can be used to critique and extend such views.
This paper is concerned with the important practical concerns brought out by dissident action in the context of a group agent, especially for the relationship between individual agency and group agency, and the ascription of responsibility to group agents based on their institutional design. I use a thought experiment to highlight a problem for some accounts of group control over, and responsibility for, group member dissident action. I then offer a diagnosis of why this problem arises in certain theories and put forward some initial suggestions for what a full account of group responsibility for dissident action would require.