The Non-Identity Problem and Historical Injustice: A Non-Problem for Reparations
Joanna Smolensky, The Graduate Center, CUNY
Idealistic Realism
Shivani Radhakrishnan, Columbia University
Monday, October 17, 4-5:30pm
Location: The Graduate Center, CUNY Room 5409
Abstracts:
The Non-Identity Problem and Historical Injustice: A Non-Problem for Reparations
In this paper, I will consider Derek Parfit’s non-identity problem and suggest that it does not pose a substantial worry for reparations in contexts of historical injustice. First, I will sketch the non-identity problem and then outline Jeremy Waldron’s view in “Superseding Historic Injustice”, which links non-identity to inheritance claims. I will go on to suggest that in these cases, the crucial feature is not that any particular person be reunited with holdings that were previously seized unjustly: rather, the concern is about justice for the community of victims, which includes the heirs of the victims. Group membership is salient to the extent that a given community is a group and not just an assemblage of persons. I will suggest that such groups persist through time, and thus are not vulnerable to the non-identity problem because their identities do not rely on the membership of any particular person. I will further argue that if one nevertheless seeks to continue worrying about non-identity in such circumstances, it is inadequate to limit the scope of the worry only to cases of past injustice: rather, the non-identity problem would seem to have far-reaching implications for our current views of inheritance more broadly.
Idealistic Realism
A long philosophical and political tradition holds that political philosophy should be realistic, because otherwise, these views will be too detached from the way our social world operates to be valuable. But this tradition neglects the possibility that political philosophy could be idealistic in the sense of not being implementable from our current circumstances, and yet provide important political results. This I argue, creates a substantial normative space for moral and political philosophers that is often ignored. I suggest that two things follow: First, the unrealistic critic faces the burden of explaining why implementation should trump other kinds of political results. Until this burden is met, there is no obvious inference to be made from a political philosophy’s inability to be implemented to its lacking political value. Second, it’s plausible that such a preference for implementability — the demand that a moral or political philosopher’s proposals be capable of realization in our current circumstances— itself prevents certain kinds of political results, what I call critical political results. I conclude by discussing the prospects for critical political results, and offer a brief diagnosis of our reluctance to make room, in our politics, for a kind of idealism.
